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Freedom or liberty - the terms will be used interchangeably in this account - is obviously of 
fundamental importance to politics. The ideal of a free society is one which animates a range of 
political positions and its pursuit has been a galvanising force in both national and international 
politics. It is, however, a difficult concept to analyse and indeed some of the complexities about 
liberty reflect an intrinsic connexion between liberty and wider ranges of political ideas to which 
it may be differently linked and understood. In their turn such ideas will be linked to ways of life 
and political cultures of which they were or are a part. 
Ideas about freedom have varied through western history. One of the major variations is to be 
found in the contrast between positive and negative liberty. So, for example, for the member of 
the Athenian city state in the fourth century B.C., freedom essentially meant participation as a 
citizen in the governance of the city and maintaining its autonomy and independence against 
encroachments a perspective illustrated for instance min the funeral speech of Pericles at the end 
of the Peloponnesian War (Thucydides 1954 p. 117). On this view liberty was associated with 
particular types of civic virtue and a free man (and it was men only) could only be free by living 
such a life oriented to the discharge of civic obligations. Freedom was directed at a collective 
good and virtue was living a life which would facilitate the achievement of this good or this type 
of human flourishing and fulfilment (Aristotle 1947) This also meant that the law could not be 
seen as the opposite of freedom since the law required the performance of such duties 
(Herodotus 1998 p. 440). Freedom was not seen as being about preserving an area of private life 
free from the encroachment of the law. Indeed, the law in this period in Greek city states 
controlled private life to a very high degree. As Demaratus said to Xerxes in explaining the 
fighting prowess of the Greeks "their master is the law" (Herodotus 1998 p.440). But the 
important point was that citizens were actively involved in law making and so the law was not to 
be seen as an alien power. This kind of approach is usually seen as embodying a positive con-
ception of liberty: freedom is not just or even freedom from coercion and interference but, rather, 
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is realised in living a particular way of life in accordance with a conception of virtue. Positive 
liberty in this sense is goal directed and implies that to be free involves living in accordance with 
certain moral values. This has been an enduring theme in western thinking about liberty and was 
important in Roman and in what Quentin Skinner has called "neo Roman" conceptions of liberty 
(Skinner 1998). It can also be found as a central theme in Christian thought in the idea that the 
service of God and living in accordance with the will of God is "perfect freedom" as the Book of 
Common Prayer says. This echoes St. John's Gospel Chapter 8 verse 32 when Jesus says "And 
ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." It is also important in the theories of 
those philosophers - perhaps most notably a thinker like Spinoza - who believed that there are 
wholly rationally metaphysically based goals of human action and that these are not matters of 
choice. Freedom means living in accordance with such rationally given goals (Hampshire 1960 
p. 195-215; Berlin 1997). So the moral values that give positive freedom its content may be 
community based as in the Greek and Roman case; they may be religiously based as in the 
Christian example; or they may be founded on some metaphysically posited assumptions about 
the nature of reason and humanity as in the case of Spinoza. 
However, a liberal account of freedom will differ in fundamental respects from those advanced 
by both ancient and modern defenders of virtue oriented views of positive freedom. Central to 
the liberal idea is that freedom is the absence of coercion: A is free when B does not prevent 
him/her from doing what he/she desires to or does not require him/her to do what he/she would 
not choose to do. Given such a conception of liberty, the liberal ideal of a free society becomes 
"...a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realise as many of their ends as 
possible, without assessment of the value of these ends as such, save in so far as they may 
frustrate the purposes of others." (Berlin 1969 page 153 n). This is also a view which Berlin 
ascribes to John Stuart Mill and Benjamin Constant whom he calls "the fathers of liberalism" 
(Berlin 1969 page 161). It is also central to John Rawls' A Theory of Justice - the most consi-
derable statement of liberal political thought in the second half of the 20t h Century (Rawls 1972 
p. 235-243). The emphasis, therefore, is upon the freedom of individual choice and not the value 
of what is then chosen in contrast to the positive approach to freedom. (Berlin 1969). On the 
negative view the only basis for the assessment of the choices made by free i.e. uncoerced indi-
viduals is where those choices prevent others choosing to pursue their own goals and purposes 
whatever they may be. Thus freedom can only be limited for the sake of freedom. 
In a sense this position may seem to be uncontroversial to the modern mind because such a 
conception of freedom seems to make few controversial moral demands. On the positive view of 
freedom it seems as though we have to have some kind of agreed set or moral goals such that 
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virtue is acting in the furtherance of such goals, whereas it might be argued that we now live in 
much more diverse and pluralistic moral communities and we cannot expect agreement on what 
the ends of human life actually are. Nor can we accept any longer religious or metaphysical 
arguments which seek to set out in a rationally authoritative way the ends and goals of human 
life. The growth of moral diversity and the decline in both religious belief and scepticism about 
metaphysical claims means that freedom has to be detached from the pursuit of particular goals 
and purposes and from community based, religious or metaphysically grounded claims about the 
ends of human life. In these circumstances of modernity we need to see freedom as being 
focussed on individual choice and the framework of rules that will prevent the choices of one 
person infringing the choices of another. A framework of law securing mutual non coercion is 
the liberal ideal in contrast to the positive liberty view of law as embodying some sort of morally 
authoritative set of substantial moral purposes. 
There may be different ways in which this account can be made more specific and less abstract 
but, as a starting point, it might be thought to be uncontroversial and acceptable whatever one's 
own political point of view. So perhaps the point made earlier that the specification of the 
concept of liberty involves the engagement of other political ideas and the ideological positions 
within which they are embedded might seem rather far fetched since the idea of freedom as 
freedom from coercion seems to be morally uncontroversial, empirical and objective. It is em-
pirical and objective because if freedom is the absence of coercion we can give an objective and 
empirical account of what constitutes coercion and thus of liberty which is the absence of 
coercion so defined. This view assumes that the idea of coercion is itself free from controversy. 
This is however far from being the case. In one sense it can be regarded as uncontroversial but 
that position is bought at the cost of a very narrow view of the nature of freedom and one which 
hardly fits our ordinary understanding of it. The uncontroversial idea of coercion is when A 
makes it impossible for B to do X or impossible for B not to do Y. Impossibility looks to be a 
wholly uncontroversial type of restraint. I make it impossible for you to go to the cinema, which 
is what you want to do, by locking you in the house. This is a wholly empirical and objective 
situation. It does not involve any morally controversial issues and nor do we need to link the idea 
of coercion as impossibility with other concepts. It is a brute matter of fact as to whether A has 
made it impossible for B to do Y. This is the view which, for example, Thomas Hobbes articu-
lated in Chapter 14 of Leviathan (Hobbes 1955 p. 84): "By Liberty, is understood, according to 
the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments...." The factual and 
objective nature of this claim is very important in that if the sense of coercion is intrinsically 
subjective then freedom, as the absence of coercion, will itself become a subjective state. There 
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would be no distinction to be drawn between being free (objective state of affairs) and feeling 
free (subjective perception). For many thinkers the maintenance of this distinction is of vital 
importance and in that context the claim that the absence of coercion is a wholly objective po-
sition and has to do with impossibility is of vital importance. The idea of impossibility is also 
linked to that of prevention. If A prevents B from doing Y then on this understanding of preven-
tion A has made it impossible for B to do X - by locking him/her in the house for example. 
However, it is not clear that things are as simple as this. It is, of course, true that A making it 
impossible for B to do X is a form of coercion. There are, however, two deep difficulties with 
this as a full account of the nature of coercion. 
The first is that it does not cover all the sorts of cases which we would normally regard as cases 
of coercion. This is particularly true of the case of threats. Threats are usually seen as forms of 
coercion and indeed the coerciveness of the law depends upon the threats contained in it: if A 
does X then he/she will go to prison. A threat does not make it impossible for A to do X, rather it 
imposes the threat of a sanction if he or she does X. A threat is not a form of rendering some-
thing impossible, it is an attempt to change behaviour by imposing on or attaching higher costs to 
the behaviour than existed before the threat was issued. So, A can make it impossible for B to do 
X by locking B in the house or A can attach a threat to B's desire to do X such as if B does X 
he/she will lose his/her job. Now this does not make it impossible for B to do X. It does, 
however, make it a very costly choice and people may well respond to that choice in different 
ways: B may say: "I won't do X because of the threat"; C may decide to do X under the same 
threat because he/she knows that another job will be easy to secure. This, however, is the rub. 
Impossibility is a situation which affects both B and C in the same way, or so it might be thought 
so far in the analysis. Threat, on the other hand, has to be linked far more to the scale of values 
and the preference schedules of the person who is threatened as to whether the person believes 
him/herself to be coerced by the threat. In an simple case B may see a threat as coercive: I can't 
park there because the notice says there will be a fine of £50 payable; C may see the same threat 
as an opportunity and the fine almost as an equivalent of a parking fee, or even as an offer (if C 
is rich) -1 can park here for only £50! The point here is that a threat is a much more subjective 
matter than prevention or impossibility. This matters because, if freedom is the absence of coer-
cion and coercion has a subjective element to it, then freedom becomes subjective. This has an 
effect on the idea of equal freedom. How could we know that citizens enjoy equal freedom if 
threats are part of coercion and the perception of the threat as coercive depends upon the scale of 
values and preferences of the person so threatened. (Steiner 1974) 
This moves us quite a long way from the seemingly objective and factual basis of impossibility. 
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However, before leaving this point it is worth examining the view that impossibility itself is 
subjective. The argument here reflects the same point as was made about threats. It may be that 
character and temperament make a difference to impossibility. The point here is this that the 
factual nature of coercion as impossibility has to be bought at the cost of a wholly physicalist 
account of A making it impossible for B to do X. That is to say that A makes it physically im-
possible for B to act in this way by means of physical restraint and anything beyond that, 
however strong the condition which A lays on B, will be a threat rather than coercion from this 
physicalist point of view just because how severe the threat is will depend on subjective 
judgement. If A issues a threat say to a politician B: "Do X and I will assassinate you" this does 
not make it impossible for B to do X. It leaves B with a choice and a choice which will reflect 
his scale of values and preferences. (Hayek 1961 p. 138). Undoubtedly some people would be 
deterred from doing X but others of strong mind and character may persist in doing it On the 
physicalist view of coercion the threat of assassination is not coercive: it is a threat and does not 
make it impossible for B to do X. There is however a question mark over this. If impossibility 
has to be reduced to purely physical incapacitation to be a form of coercion and that the threat of 
death is not therefore a form of impossibility just because it engages the subjective point of view 
of the person threatened, then it seems that coercion can apply only to a very small number of 
cases and that the threat of murder is not an infringement of liberty because it is not coercive in 
the impossibilist sense of coercion. There may be a consistent line here but it is bought at the 
cost of being a very implausible account of coercion and thereby of freedom as a political ideal. 
If we admit threats to the scope of coercion doesn't this make the idea of freedom as the absence 
of coercion inextricably subjective? This is possible, but there is potentially a way out of this 
difficulty. The subjectivist problem is that a threat and even whether it is perceived as a threat 
has to involve the scale of values of the person threatened and that makes it subjective. However, 
it is possible to argue that there are certain types of human goods which may be regarded as 
generic or universal so that a threat against those sorts of goods can always be regarded as coer-
cive. On the face of it this might look like a return to full blown positive ideas of freedom out-
lined earlier requiring either a community to have a unified sense of a flourishing human life or 
some religious or metaphysical basis for such a conception. However, there is a difference from 
older forms of positive freedom and what they require to underpin them. The idea here is that 
there are universal values and universal norms of human flourishing in terms of which freedom 
has to be understood in that a threat to those values will always be a form of coercion and 
freedom is the absence of coercion. So for example, it might be argued that a good such as life 
itself, a good such as autonomy, and the fulfilment of basic needs can be regarded as universal or 
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generic goods - if not for all human beings - then at least within a particular society with a 
particular culture. What gives them this generic status is that they are necessary conditions for 
the pursuit of any other good whatever it may turn out to be. In this sense while it is a positive 
conception of freedom it is so in a rather different way from those mentioned earlier (Gewirth 
1978). Those conceptions of positive freedom diminished or even eliminated the scope of 
individual choice: freedom is living in accordance with metaphysically, religiously or socially 
given values and does not focus on choice. The current idea, however, retains the centrality of 
choice and the fact that what is chosen is not subject to moral evaluation other than when it 
infringes the choices of others but at the same time argues that there are in fact certain types of 
goods which are essential preconditions of choice. Such goods are generic goods or primary 
goods (Gewirth 1978; Rawls 1971; Plant, Lesser and Taylor Gooby 1981). A threat to these 
goods is in fact a threat to the possibility of choice and is thus inherently coercive. This would 
certainly make the idea of coercion normative in that a threat would be coercive if it was a threat 
against a generic good but not necessarily at the cost of subjectivism if we can agree on a set of 
generic goods which would then be central to the idea of coercion and thus to the idea of 
freedom. However, the issue of whether there can be a coherent account of generic or necessary 
goods is itself a large issue in political theory. It is revealing that the revival of this idea in 
political theory has been called "neo Aristotelian" (Nussbauml990; Nussbaum 1993). The point 
at this stage of the analysis, however, is that without such an account it might well seem that 
freedom would become radically subjectivist. Nevertheless, it is argued by critics of this app-
roach that ideas about basic needs and other sorts of generic goods are subject to quite a lot of 
interpretation and dispute and that the escape from subjectivism may be more apparent than real. 
Also, as Amartya Sen has argued the ideas of basic needs and primary goods may be inadequate 
do the work suggested by theorists who support the universal goods approach. This argument 
turns upon the point that people will have different capacities and abilities in terms of transfor-
ming basic or primary goods into instruments for achieving their self chosen ends. So, if we are 
to secure equal or even fair allocations of freedom we have to look at the types and sources of 
differential capacities to make use of primary or generic goods. This again is going to involve 
moral controversy (Sen 1999). 
This leads on to two further interrelated points: the relationship between freedom and a range of 
choice and the link between that question and determining whether a society is free or unfree. 
Does our view of freedom link up intrinsically with the idea that to be free a person has to have a 
range of significant choice open to him or her? There is nothing in the idea of freedom as being 
just the absence of coercion that would require this. A defender of this view of what is normally 
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called negative liberty would say that the question of the identification of liberty is one thing and 
what someone is able to do with it and the choices that are open to that person is quite another. 
Liberty is negative, it is about the absence of coercion; the alternative view is a positive account 
of which requires that there should be a range of morally significant choices open to a person be-
fore we can count the person as being free. On the negative view of liberty the range of choices 
open to a person has nothing to do with freedom and again is a way of subjectivising liberty 
(Hayek 1960). What is a morally significant range of choice? How is it to be decided what it is? 
How would it fit with the idea of equal freedom? We can make sense of the idea of equal 
freedom if we are all to be equally free from the same forms of coercion, but what about if 
freedom were to be understood as having a particular range of choices? How would such a 
moralised concept of positive freedom fit with the fact that we live in pluralistic and morally 
divergent societies and therefore agreement about a morally significant range of choice is diffi-
cult if not impossible to attain? 
One way of trying to fix more clearly the issues at stake here would be to ask the question of 
how we could know that one society is freer than another? If freedom is to be a useful idea in 
politics then we need to know how to answer this question. From the standpoint of a defender of 
a strictly negative view of freedom this poses a difficult if not fatal objection to the positive 
theorist who links freedom with a range of significant choice. Any account of such a range is 
going to be highly controversial and yet would be central to the judgement that society A is a 
freer society than society B because A reflects this range of choice which might include for 
example: the ability to choose a government, to emigrate, to be able to criticise the government, 
to own property etc. One only has to start considering what might fall within the range to see that 
it is controversial. From the negative liberty point of view in which there is a desire to avoid 
morally controversial assumptions the answer to the question as to whether society A is freer 
than society B has to be quantitative. If freedom is the absence of coercion then the central 
question at stake here is that of how many rules there are preventing action in society A as oppo-
sed to society B, not what morally significant range of choice is available in society A as 
opposed to society B. We avoid that qualitative question by a focus on the quantitative one about 
the number of coercive rules operative in each society. This reduces the issue to a quantitative 
and empirical one, not a highly moralised one as it would be for the defender of positive 
freedom. Leaving aside the fact that, as we have seen, the issue of coercion may not be as un-
controversial as this argument assumes, there are in its own terms defects in it. As Charles 
Taylor has pointed out, this purely quantitative approach is likely to lead to highly counterintui-
tive results because it is almost inevitably going to be the case that an underdeveloped society is 
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going to have fewer coercive rules since there are fewer differentiated areas of life to which such 
rules would apply (Taylor 1985). So to take Taylor's own example of Albania under communist 
rule, it may well be that there were in fact fewer coercive there than say in the UK at the same 
period because there was very little needed in the way of traffic regulation, very little in the way 
of financial rules, very little if anything in the way of rules to do with property and contract and 
so forth. So, on a purely quantitative and empirical view of it we would arrive at the highly 
counter intuitive result that Albania was a freer country than the UK at the same time. Surely the 
answer is, the defender of positive liberty will say is that whatever the number of rules there are 
certain important things that one is able to do in the UK that you were unable to do in Albania 
and it is this contrast between being able to realise certain valuable human abilities and not the 
bare number of rules that makes one society freer than another. In a sense this brings us back to 
the issue of necessary or generic goods mentioned earlier and what is the link between freedom, 
ability to realise such basic or generic goods. 
This also extends the range of such basic goods to include ideas about independence and non 
domination as well as a set of basic or primary goods to meet basic physical needs. If we regard 
autonomy as crucial to an account of human goods then such goods as independence and non 
domination are also necessary goods for the achievement of freedom (Skinner 1998). Along with 
other primary goods such features are essential to those abilities which are conditions of agency 
and action. 
The defender of negative liberty may well seek to deny any link between liberty and ability. On 
this view there is a categorical distinction between A being free to do X and A being able to do 
X. Whether someone is able to do what he or she is free to do has nothing to do with the nature 
of freedom. This position relies on the following claim: there must be a categorical difference 
between freedom and ability because when I am free I am not coerced, within that sphere of 
freedom as the absence of coercion there is an indefinitely large number of things that I am free 
to do in the sense that I am not prevented from doing. However capable, clever and rich I am I 
am only able to do a small number of that indefinitely large number of things. Hence freedom 
and ability are not extensionally equivalent. This attempt to draw a distinction between freedom 
and ability is centrally important in the theory of freedom and is also politically relevant. Hayek, 
for example, argues in The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek 1960 p. 17) that if freedom is identi-
fied with ability or power then the liberal ideal of a free society in which there is equal freedom 
from coercion becomes transformed into a socialist order because freedom means ability and the 
state as the guarantor of equal freedom would have to go as far as it could to equalise abilities 
and this would mean radical redistribution of all sorts of resources to improve the abilities of the 
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least able in the interests of arriving at a free society. This is apart from the question about how 
we should identify, fix and rank the abilities that bear most on the exercise of liberty. This again 
is a normative exercise about which we should not expect agreement. It also raises a more meta-
physical question in the view of the defender of negative liberty namely that positive freedom 
which links freedom, ability and the realisation of a set of valued human goods has to presuppose 
quite a complex and detailed account of human nature and human agency which is absent from 
the position of negative liberty - so it is said. Such a conception of human nature and human 
agency is going to be highly disputable and does nothing to help fix the idea of liberty in a clear 
and operational way. 
So we need to look in more detail at the issue of agency and ability. It can certainly be argued 
that the defender of negative liberty is wrong in thinking that he/she can produce a foil account 
of negative liberty that does not raise similar questions. I have already pointed out that the 
concept of coercion which is central to negative freedom either has to be restricted to impossibi-
lity which is implausible or is in fact going to engage some quite large scale account of those 
goods a threat to which will always be regarded as coercive (Hayek, 1960 p. 138) and any defen-
ce of such a set of goods is going to have to draw upon ideas of human nature, agency and abi-
lity. The only alternative is to take the view that coercion is always subjectively perceived and 
that therefore there is no distinction between feeling free and being free. This is an even worse 
position - radical subjectivism about freedom and coercion - than the alternative view which has 
to include an account of agency and ability. 
However, there is a more constructive way of looking at the matter than this. In order to see why 
we do need a conception of agency in order to have a folly developed concept of freedom we 
might consider what conditions have to be satisfied to make it intelligible to ascribe freedom to 
an individual. After all a stone is an individual thing and while it may roll down a hill and be 
moved we would find it unintelligible to ascribe freedom to it (unless of course, as in children's 
stories, human characteristics were given to the stone). The ascription of freedom applies only to 
agents who are capable of reasoned choice. This is a necessary condition of the concept of free-
dom being intelligible to us. So, if agency is a necessary condition of the ascription of freedom it 
is difficult for the defender of negative liberty to rule out of court the concept of agency and its 
specification. In terms of its specification it might be thought to require both basic needs being 
met and generic human capacities and capabilities being recognised as central to the ascription of 
freedom to such an agent. This point can be made a bit more concrete in a simple example. As 
we have seen there is an argument to say that freedom and ability are two separate things, but 
this can be doubted. It makes no sense to ask whether someone is free to do something which no 
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one is able to do. It is not intelligible to ask whether someone is free to jump from Oxford to 
New York because it is not a human capability. No one was free to write a run a hedge fund in 
1066 since no one was capable of doing so and there was no institutional setting to make it pos-
sible. From these examples we might want to say that a generalised ability to do X is a necessary 
condition of determining whether A is free or unfree to do X. If a generalised ability is a 
necessary condition for the ascription of freedom or unfreedom then it cannot be the case that 
there is a categorical difference between freedom and ability. So on this account we have to set 
the range of freedom within the range of human capabilities and we cannot do that without 
knowing what they are, which are the most important and which enable human beings to flourish 
the most. The answers to these questions will be disputable but they cannot be bypassed. Hence, 
it is very difficult to argue that freedom and ability are separate things and that an account of 
freedom can be given without engaging with some view of capabilities. 
Defenders of negative liberty have wanted to resist the link between freedom and ability for 
another reason too. That is that they have wanted to say that freedom as the absence of coercion 
is clear and definite, the ability to make use of freedom thus defined is best seen in terms of a set 
of conditions for freedom. Thus while each person may be free to dine at the Ritz Hotel in the 
sense of not being prevented from doing so nevertheless the resources that one needs to dine at 
the Ritz should be seen as conditions without the fulfilment of which one would not be able to do 
so. The conditions for dining at the Ritz are however different from the objective definition of 
the freedom to dine at the Ritz. The question of whether an individual has the resources to do so 
or not is quite a different matter. On this view there is no logical connection between the 
conditions and the freedom. This, however, may be doubted if one takes into account the agency 
focussed view of freedom set out as an alternative above. There is in addition an argument which 
involves no departure from negative accounts of liberty but which shows that conditions are not 
just contingent features of freedom (Swift 2001). If a country has a law which bans a particular 
group of people from using the trains then we would normally regard that as a coercive law 
(putting on one side some of the issues about coercion cited earlier). At the same time a railway 
company, or for that matter the state, if the railway is nationalised, may say that no one is free to 
travel on the train without a valid ticket. The ticket costs money which A does not have. Hence 
he/she is not free to travel on the train. That is to say the condition of not having the money 
enters into the specification of the freedom in question and therefore is not merely a contingent 
factor or condition of freedom but part of what makes the individual free to travel on the train. 
On this view therefore questions about conditions and abilities cannot be separated from the 
basic nature of freedom. 
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I want now to go back to the issue of the individual's own consciousness of freedom and take up 
a different theme although it is linked to the idea of the perception of coercion or prevention. 
What are we to make of the idea that someone may be prevented from doing something not by 
some form of external coercion but by something about their own character or their own nature. 
An obsessive compulsive disorder gets in the way of A doing X and indeed may require him/her 
to do Y (to follow the dictates of the compulsion and wash his/her hands every few minutes let 
us say) which otherwise A would not do. The question for this account is does this situation have 
any political significance? Or is it just a matter of personal pathology? 
Some have argued that there is a link between mental disorder and a political order such that 
personal pathologies cannot be separated from the social context in which someone finds him or 
herself and that this social situation may well have some strong political salience. On this view a 
pathology which prevented someone from doing something has political significance and might 
be thought of as a form of coercion which arises at least indirectly from society at large. 
Certainly R. D. Laing (Laing 1967) Herbert Marcuse (Marcuse 1964), and Eric Fromm (Fromm 
1963) have argued in this sort of way and this idea of freedom as liberation not just from the 
coercive power of the state but also from aspects of one's own self that inhibit the capacity for 
action was a powerful one in the 1960's (Berlin 1964). It still has a resonance though in the 
argument deployed in this essay too in the following way. In the discussion about coercion and 
impossibility I pointed out that circumstances which might lead one person to regard a course of 
action as impossible for him/her might for another person be seen as a challenge but one that 
could be overcome. That is to say that the perception of coercion is related to features of an 
individual's mental state. If this state is pathological, then so too is likely to be the perception of 
the potentially coercive set of circumstances. Again this would reinforce two points made earlier. 
The first is that once we move beyond physicalist types of impossibility then the perception of 
coercion has a strong psychological element and that this will lapse into subjectivism without 
some idea of the basic goods of agency. In the pathological state the basic goods approach 
becomes even more important in the sense that if such goods constitute some kind of generic or 
universal feature of agency then a failure to recognise these goods may be part of the threshold 
for the judgement that this failure of perception is indeed pathological as opposed to being only 
an alternative perception. This idea is consistent with one of the criticisms of positive freedom 
that it is intrinsically paternalistic. If being free involves pursuing and recognising a set of basic 
goods does this sanction interference with an individual to ensure that he or she is pursuing these 
goods even if that is not what he or she desires or has a conscious interest in. This would be a 
modern version of Rousseau's dictum about "forcing someone to be free." In the view of critics 
of positive freedom this is an intrinsic feature of positive freedom. 
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I now want to turn to the idea of rights and the link between rights and freedom. It is frequently 
argued that basically there are two ways of grounding ideas of basic moral rights and they are 
liberty and interests. In this essay on liberty I shall concentrate on rights and liberty. Again, the 
distinction between negative and positive liberty is important here. On the negative view of 
rights a right is a protection against forbidden forms of coercion: the right to life is a right not to 
be killed, a right to property is a right not to have the property sequestrated, a right to bodily 
integrity is a right not to be raped, assaulted and so forth. These are essentially rights to negative 
freedoms. The duties imposed on others by such rights claims are also negative. They are funda-
mentally to do with forbearance. I respect your right to life by abstaining from killing you, your 
right to property by abstaining from seizing it and your rights in your body by not abusing your 
body in proscribed ways. These forbearances are also duties in respect of negative liberty. Nega-
tive liberty is compromised by coercion, so respecting another person's negative liberty implies 
that I will not coerce them. On this view there is an intrinsic link between negative liberty and 
essentially negative rights along with the recognition of mutual forbearance in the common in-
terest of securing negative freedom. 
If, however freedom is seen in a positive way as involving the satisfaction of needs and the 
development of powers and abilities then the connection with rights become very different. On 
the negative view, rights are respected by forbearance and not by positive action, whereas if 
rights are positive in terms of the protection of positive freedom then in turn this requires posi-
tive action to protect rights. However, there is a difference, it is argued, in that in the case of 
negative rights the corresponding negative duties lie on both individuals and the state and since 
these are negative duties which can always be performed whether by the individual or the state. 
In each case all that is required is that the individual refrains from coercion. This is not the case 
with positive rights which are typically going to be social, economic and welfare rights. In order 
for these rights to be protected the absence of coercion is not enough. There is a positive duty to 
provide the resources necessary for meeting the right in question. No longer is the right to life, 
for example, to be seen as a negative right not to be killed - that is a defence of negative free-
dom; but as a right to the means to life as a positive right in defence of positive freedom. The 
problem, as critics see it, is that such rights, unlike negative rights, run up against the issue of the 
scarcity. Positive duties involve costs whereas duties of forbearance are costless. This leads to 
the point that positive rights typically cannot be held against all others - fellow citizens and the 
state - since fellow citizens as individuals do not have the resources to meet these positive 
claims. So, if positive rights protect positive freedoms, it is argued by critics that this implies a 
fundamental difference between what it means to respect liberty in the negative sense and what it 
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means in the positive sense and in the latter case it means that the state has to take responsibility 
for the duty which can be held equally in terms of negative rights against both the state and the 
individual. So the difference between negative and positive liberty means that there are 
differences between the duties in respect of these two sorts of liberties and differences in the role 
of the state and one's fellow citizens in terms of protecting each type of liberty (Plant 2009) 
The issue of freedom and coercion enters in another way too and that is in the context of the 
market economy. It is central to the ideas of economic liberals and libertarians that the outcomes 
of free markets are legitimate whatever may be the degree of inequality which attends those out-
comes (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1972).The point is that if each act of exchange in a market is 
uncoerced then it is legitimate. The aggregate effect of the innumerable acts of uncoerced ex-
change that occur in a market is to produce at any one time a "pattern" of income and wealth. 
That pattern, however, is not intended by anyone and is legitimate because it has arisen out of 
free exchange. In a sense uncoerced exchange gives a kind of procedural legitimacy to the out-
come. We have, however, seen that the issue of coercion is a complex and disputable one and yet 
it lies at the heart of free market defences. On the impossibility understanding of coercion, an 
exchange is coercive only if someone is physically forced into it - otherwise it is an act of free 
exchange. This is somewhat implausible as a full account of coercion and yet if we move to the 
idea of threat this is quite complex in economic contexts. As we saw, a threat may well depend 
upon the perception of the person threatened and in the economic context this is likely to be 
heavily influenced by that person's economic position and the resources that have. So what 
would be a coerced or for that matter uncoerced contract in economic terms is likely to depend 
on the relative bargaining powers and resources of the parties to the contract. Two points are 
worth making about this. The first is that on the pure theory of negative liberty resources do not 
bear upon the issue of freedom but yet they are bound to do so in the context of coercion or lack 
of it in respect of economic contracts. What constitutes a contract that you cannot refuse will de-
pend very much on the resources of the individual who is party to the contract (Green 1888; 
Hayek 1960) So if coercion is partly a matter of perception, this is problematic since it lies at the 
heart of the economic liberal view of the legitimacy of market outcomes. Obviously a positive 
theory of liberty would regard any transaction that threatened basic or generic goods as potential-
ly coercive and a free market would have to be modified in its operation to protect those goods 
or to have an extra-market set of arrangements like the welfare state to protect the goods. 
So we can see that the issue of liberty is crucial to modern politics as one of the central values of 
the modern world but it is much easier to invoke than to analyse. 
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